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TAKING POP-UPS SERIOUSLY: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INFIELD FLY RULE 
NEIL B. COHEN*
SPENCER WEBER WALLER**
In 1975, the University of Pennsylvania published a remarkable item. 
Rather than being deemed an article, note, or comment, it was classified as 
an “Aside.” The item was of course, The Common Law Origins of the 
Infield Fly Rule.1 This piece of legal scholarship was remarkable in 
numerous ways. First, it was published anonymously and the author’s 
identity was not known publicly for decades.2 Second, it was genuinely 
funny, perhaps one of the funniest pieces of true scholarship in a field 
dominated mostly by turgid prose and ineffective attempts at humor by 
way of cutesy titles or bad puns. Third, it was short and to the point3 in a 
field in which a reader new to law reviews would assume that authors are 
paid by the word or footnote. Fourth, the article was learned and actually 
about something—how baseball’s infield fly rule4 is consistent with, and 
an example of, the common law processes of rule creation and legal 
reasoning in the Anglo-American tradition. 
 * Jeffrey D. Forchelli Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Professor Cohen gratefully 
acknowledges the support of a Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Stipend in the preparation of 
this article. This article is an outgrowth of a paper presented by the authors at the symposium “Batter 
Up! From the Baseball Field to the Courthouse: Contemporary Issues Facing Baseball Practitioners” 
sponsored by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. 
 ** Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago 
School of Law. With thanks to Joshua R. Fink, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Class of 
2003, for his excellent research assistance. 
 1. Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474 (1975) 
[hereinafter Common Law Origins]. 
 2. The author is in fact Will Stevens, a fact discovered by Professor Cohen when giving the 
annual Hughie Jennings Memorial Lecture at the University of Maryland School of Law several years 
ago. After delivery of the paper, in which the Common Law Origins was praised and the anonymity of 
its author was bemoaned, Mr. Stevens approached Cohen and indicated that he was the hitherto secret 
author. Later, this secret was revealed in print, see Roger S. Clark, Steven Spielberg’s “Amistad” and 
Other Things I have Thought About in the Past Forty Years: International (Criminal) Law, Conflict of 
Laws, Insurance and Slavery, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 371, 372 n.1 (1999). 
 3. Common Law Origins was 6 ½ pages long and contained 48 footnotes, two of which were to 
the word “the” in the Oxford English Dictionary. See Common Law Origins, supra note 1, at 1474 
nn.1, 4. 
 4. An infield fly is a fair fly ball which can be caught by an infielder with ordinary effort, when 
at least first and second base are occupied and there are less than two out. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 
1998 OFFICIAL RULES OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 27 (1997) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RULES]. The 
umpire shall declare “Infield Fly” and the batter is automatically out. Id. at 27–28. If the infielder 
intentionally drops a fair ball, the ball remains in play. Id. Base runners may advance at their own risk. 
Id. at 28. 
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Most importantly for our purposes, Common Law Origins was the 
launching point of the Law and Baseball movement.5 Legal scholars 
simply cannot keep their hands off the infield fly rule–either substantively 
or as a metaphor.6 An eminent antitrust scholar quickly responded to 
Common Law Origins, arguing that the infield fly rule was in fact the 
product of law and economics concerns about efficiency (and potentially 
other more humanistic concerns) and that Common Law Origins was 
fatally flawed in portraying the infield fly rule as inevitable or the product 
of a scientific legal regime.7 Metaphorically,8 the infield fly rule also has 
been used to analyze legal problems in tax,9 evidence,10 labor law,11 
constitutional law,12 e-commerce,13 and the law of prostitution,14 as well as 
topics in areas as far a field as linguistics.15 It has been utilized to analyze 
 5. Charles Yablon, On the Contribution of Baseball to American Legal Theory, 104 YALE L.J. 
227 (1994). 
 6. The known legal commentary on the infield fly rule through 1995 has been collected in 
SPENCER WEBER WALLER ET AL., BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 4–33 (1995). 
 7. See John J. Flynn, Further Aside, A Comment on “The Common Law Origins of the Infield 
Fly Rule,” 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 241 (1978). 
 8. See Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)he Will Come: Judicial Opinions, Metaphors, 
Baseball, and “the Sex Stuff”, 28 CONN. L. REV. 813 (1996). For the view that metaphor is the central 
organizing principle of law and cognition, see Steven L. Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 
721, 739, 744 (1996). For how this relates to baseball, see Steven L. Winter, “Bull Durham” and the 
Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639 (1990). 
 9. Mark W. Cochran, The Infield Fly Rule and the Internal Revenue Code: An Even Further 
Aside, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567 (1988). 
 10. Margaret A. Berger, Rethinking the Applicability of Evidentiary Rules at Sentencing: Of 
Relevant Conduct and Hearsay and the Need for an Infield Fly Rule, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 96 (1992). 
 11. R. Jake Locklear, Arbitration in Olympic Disputes: Should Arbitrators Review the Field of 
Play Decisions or Officials?, 4 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 199 (2003). 
 12. Alan Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional 
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1995). 
 13. David Beckman, E-mail Rules to Live By, 83 A.B.A. J. 78 (1997). 
 14. Clyde DeWitt, The World’s Oldest Profession, at http://www.avnonline.com/ 
index.php?Primary_Navigation=Editorial&Action=View_Article&Content_ID=105802 (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2004). Mr. DeWitt stated: 
In the first place, prostitution is illegal only where the legislature says it is illegal. It is not 
illegal everywhere. Like the infield fly rule, rules against prostitution were put in place to 
accomplish some objective that the drafters thought was worthwhile. The laws against 
prostitution are more complex than the relatively straightforward infield fly rule (“If there are 
runners on first and second or first, second, and third with less than two outs and the ball is 
popped up in the infield where an infielder with reasonable effort can catch the ball, the batter 
is automatically out.”). And they are more debatable (the argument against the infield fly rule 
is that an infielder intentionally dropping a pop-up in an effort to make a double play would 
transform a mundane pop-up into a very exciting play, and create interesting new strategies). 
Id. 
 15. Consider the following excerpt from the definition of “linguistic coordination systems” in 
The Dictionary of Critical Sociology: 
In postmodern semiotics, acceptable communication is dependent on the language in use. 
Precise sense making cannot occur from outside the signifying sphere (la langue) in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/4
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problems in cases ranging from the law of sexual harassment16 to the law 
governing compromise and settlement.17 Indeed, the infield fly rule has 
even been cited as a possible topic of political protest18 and has been cited 
in religious sermons.19 Common Law Origins has been widely cited in 
articles dealing with both baseball and such diverse other subjects as legal 
theory,20 legal history,21 bankruptcy,22 criminal law,23 civil rights,24 
constitutional law,25 and legal citation.26 This modest Aside has further 
operation. To illustrate, in order to explain baseball's "infield fly rule" it is essential to rely 
upon baseball terminology. Without knowledge of the language of the sport, it is not possible 
to explain the infield fly rule. 
Robert E. Mazur, Dictionary of Critical Sociology, at http://www.public.iastate.edu/~rmazur/ 
dictionary/l.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 16. See, e.g., Mann v. Lima, 290 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.R.I. 2003). 
 17. See, e.g., North County Contractors Ass’n v. Touchstone Ins. Servs., 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085 
(Ct. App. 1994). 
 18. Johan Goldberg, It’s Not the Pervert’s Problem, It’s Ours: Punish Bad Acts, Not Thought 
Crimes, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, July 25, 2001, at http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/ 
goldberg072501.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). Mr. Goldberg opined:
Thankfully the Soviet Union is gone but, alas, American and European liberal intellectuals 
still like to refer to America's “political prisoners.” America has no political prisoners. It 
imprisons criminals, some of whom, incidentally, have politics liberals like or admire. Mumia 
Abu-Jamal, for example, is on death row because he murdered a cop, not because he wrote a 
provocative essay questioning federalism or the infield-fly rule. And yet in America, and 
around the world, he's hailed as a “political prisoner.” 
Id. 
 19. Scott Hoezee, Luke 10:25-37 “The Gospel Thing”, at http://www.calvincrc.org/sermons/ 
topics/justice/justice5.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2004): 
Maybe it's rather like someone who devotes himself to learning every last rule of baseball: 
there is finally only one reason to pursue such a goal and that is gaining the ability to make 
judgments on what is fair and what is foul in an actual game. Understanding the infield fly 
rule or what constitutes a major league balk is totally boring if it is just a theory. You need to 
see a game before you can use what you know. That's why people who know the rules the 
best tend to be the same people who watch the most baseball!” 
Id. 
 20. See Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the 
Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535, 535 (1999); Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal 
Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 263 (1989); Yablon, 
supra note 5 at 238. 
 21. See Clark, supra note 2, at 372; David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 466, 466 (1983). 
 22. Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1031, 1046 (1994); Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre: The 
Problem of Potential Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy, 26 CONN. L. REV. 913, 917 (1996). 
 23. See Berger, supra note 10. 
 24. Jeffrey P. Ferrier, Comment, Title IX Leaves Some Athletes Asking “Can We Play Too?”, 44 
CATH. U. L. REV. 841, 842 (1995); Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law, 46 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 239, 242 (1998). 
 25. Chen, supra note 12, at 283; Aside, Don’t Cry Over Filled Milk: The Neglected Footnote 
Three to Carolene Products, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1558 (1988). Bravo to the Penn law review to 
have the courage to return to the field of humorous asides after the unapproachable success of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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inspired sub-movements examining the legal implications and metaphors 
arising from other baseball rules such as the now infamous “pine tar” 
rule.27 In a very real sense, Mr. Stevens’ work has both created and 
dominated its field. 
For all its greatness, though, Common Law Origins is a creature of its 
time. Written with reference only to common law reasoning, it bears a 
striking resemblance to the legal process school’s conception of the proper 
development of law through a process of politically neutral reasoned 
elaboration.28 Even in 1975, the concept of the legal process school as the 
appropriate jurisprudential tool to view law was under heavy attack. 
Moreover, Common Law Origins appears to have deliberately chosen not 
to address earlier jurisprudential movements such as legal positivism, legal 
realism, and natural law which would have offered quite different 
explorations for the evolution and significance of the infield fly rule. In 
addition, Common Law Origins was published in 1975 at the very 
beginning of the flowering of what is now often referred to as post-modern 
jurisprudence with its many different approaches to challenging legal 
orthodoxy. Such challenges can be found in an array of sources ranging 
from law and economics, critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, the 
cutting edge work of Michel Foucault, the growing internationalization of 
legal studies, and the growing cultural significance of Vince McMahon, 
the creator of both the World Wrestling Federation and the short-lived 
XFL. 
We propose to go beyond the common law origins of the infield fly 
rule and do what the author chose not to do: namely, explore the different 
spaces for an infield fly rule from the point of view of the great 
jurisprudential movements of the last hundred years. In so doing we 
conclude (i) that post-modern jurisprudence strongly suggests that the 
infield fly rule was far more socially constructed and historically 
Common Law Origins. 
 26. See Arthur Austin, Footnote Skulduggery and Other Bad Habits, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1009, 
1019 (1990); Mary I. Coombs, Lowering One’s Cites: A (Sort of) Review of the University of Chicago 
Manual of Legal Citation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (1990); David E.B. Smith, Just When You 
Thought It Was Safe to go Back into the Bluebook: Notes on the Fifteenth Edition, 67 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 275, 276 (1991). 
 27. See Christopher H. Clancy & Jonathan A. Weiss, A Pine Tar Gloss on Quasi-Legal Images, 5 
CARDOZO L. REV. 411 (1984); Jared Tobin Finkelstein, Commentary, In Re Brett: The Sticky Problem 
of Statutory Construction, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 430, 435 (1983); Donald J. Rapson, A Home-Run 
Application of Established Principles of Statutory Construction: UCC Analyses, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 
441 (1984). 
 28. See HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); 
Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The Legal Process, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1573 (1996) (book review). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/4
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contingent than previously acknowledged, and (ii) that it is much more 
difficult to be clever, funny, and insightful about law and baseball than it 
appears. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
We tend to think of the infield fly rule as inevitable, in that the 
evolution of the game would necessarily have lead to the adoption of the 
rule to address the issue that is its subject. As Common Law Origins 
demonstrates, though, the rule was not inevitable–it evolved through 
conscious choices.29 There were, indeed, forks in the road that led to the 
rule. As Yogi Berra advised, “[w]hen you come to a fork in the road, take 
it.”30 The baseball legal system followed that advice and ultimately lead us 
to the present-day infield fly rule. The infield fly rule is now such a part of 
the core of the game that one way to separate true fans from mere 
dilettantes is by their knowledge of the rule.31
The infield-fly rule itself is quite simple: 
An INFIELD FLY is a fair fly ball (not including a line drive nor an 
attempted bunt) which can be caught by an infielder with ordinary 
effort, when first and second, or first, second and third bases are 
occupied, before two are out. The pitcher, catcher and any outfielder 
who stations himself in the infield on the play shall be considered 
infielders for the purpose of this rule. 
When it seems apparent that a batted ball will be an Infield Fly, the 
umpire shall immediately declare “Infield Fly” for the benefit of the 
runners. If the ball is near the baselines, the umpire shall declare 
“Infield Fly, if Fair.” 
The ball is alive and runners may advance at the risk of the ball 
being caught, or retouch and advance after the ball is touched, the 
same as on any fly ball.32
 29. See Common Law Origins, supra note 1, at 1476–81. 
 30. YOGI BERRA & DAVID KAPLAN, WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT: 
INSPIRATION AND WISDOM FROM ONE OF BASEBALL'S GREATEST HEROES (2001). 
 31. Cf. DINER (Warner Brothers 1982) (Baltimore Colts trivia quiz which must be passed by a 
fiancé before she will be allowed to marry one of the principal characters). For more information, see 
The Internet Movie Database, Diner (1982), at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083833 (last visited Nov. 
21, 2004). 
 32. OFFICIAL RULES, supra note 4, at 27–28. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As explained by Ralph Nelson, Major League Baseball’s Vice 
President for umpiring: 
The Infield Fly Rule was instituted to protect the offense from a 
possibly "unfair" double play. If there were runners on first and 
second (or bases loaded) and less than 2 out, runners would 
normally hold their base on a pop-up to the infield since the ball 
would, in all likelihood, be caught. Without the Infield Fly Rule, an 
infielder could drop an easy pop-up (or let it drop untouched) and 
turn a double play, since the runners would then be forced. The 
rules makers didn't think this was fair and instituted this rule.33
At its core, the infield fly rule is a rule against a form of strategic play 
that results in a deviation from the normal principle that the offensive team 
benefits from always seeking to hit the ball in such a way as to maximize 
the chance of a base hit and that the defensive team benefits from always 
seeking to field batted balls. Yet, it would be misleading to suggest that 
the game does not tolerate deviations from that norm. Consider the 
sacrifice bunt (on offense) or the intentional walk (on defense). These 
practices (both overrated, suggests modern sabermetrics34) are neither 
condemned as bad sportsmanship nor prohibited. 
Why is the intentionally uncaught infield fly different? At a basic level, 
there is one important difference. A sacrifice bunt or an intentional walk 
involves a trade-off. In the case of a sacrifice bunt, the offensive team 
trades an out for the advancement of base runners. In the case of an 
intentional walk, the defensive team allows an additional base runner, but 
gains an inferior batter at the plate, the possibility of a double play, or 
both. Thus, in each of these situations, the team exercising the strategy 
gains a benefit, but incurs a cost in order to obtain it. While sabermetrics 
can assess whether the benefit outweighs the cost,35 the benefit clearly is 
not without cost or risk. Dropping an infield fly with runners on first and 
 33. Ralph Nelson, Ask the Umpire, at http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/ 
mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=mlb_20010622_umpireqa_cols&team_id=mlb (last visited Nov. 21, 
2004). 
 34. See, e.g., Are All Hits Equal?, at http://64.21.65.46/rhoids2000/inningStateMatrix.htm (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2004) (analyzing when sacrifice bunt produces better outcome than having batter seek 
base hit). 
 35. David Grabiner, The Sabermetric Manifesto, at http://www.baseball1.com/bb-data/grabiner/ 
manifesto.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). Sabermetrics was popularized in the ground breaking 
analysis of baseball decision making and statistical measures pioneered by Bill James. See generally 
BILL JAMES, THE NEW HISTORICAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT (2001); BILL JAMES, BILL JAMES 
BASEBALL ABSTRACT (1983). Its origins, however, extend back at least a half-century to Branch 
Rickey. See Branch Rickey, Goodbye to Some Old Baseball Ideas, LIFE, Aug. 2, 1954, at 78. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/4
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second bases (and perhaps third base as well) with fewer than two outs is 
different, though. The defensive team would receive a benefit (an easy 
double play as the runners must hold their bases to see if the ball will be 
caught) at no cost. 
Why should such a creative strategy be banned? The answer depends, 
of course, on one’s perspective on legal rules and rulemaking. 
II. NATURAL LAW AND THE INFIELD FLY 
Most versions of natural law philosophy posit the existence of 
universal laws founded on some conception of moral precepts. The 
dominant view of natural law has traced the moral foundations of law to 
some notion of religious truth and divine revelation.36 Grounding the 
infield fly rule in the religious-based view of natural law creates a number 
of analytical difficulties. The Jewish Torah, the New Testament, the 
Koran, the Bhavad Gita, and virtually all the scriptural works of the major 
religions, with the exception of the Book of the Mormon, predate the 
invention of baseball by centuries or millennia. None discuss baseball, let 
alone the infield fly rule. Games and play are not a frequent topic except 
by way of prohibition on certain days deemed too holy for such frivolous 
activity.37
Lacking formal training in comparative religion makes it both difficult 
and presumptuous for us to reach firm conclusions. Nonetheless, the Bible 
is a fertile source for analysis of the meaning and nature of law.38 The Old 
Testament uses the phrase “commandments,” “statutes,” and “laws”39 to 
distinguish among the types and sources of law. The commentary to this 
section identifies “commandments” as laws given by God that enforce 
fundamental moral precepts.40 “Statutes” are divine laws that are a direct 
command but do not have an immediately moral basis, with the biblical 
injunction against eating the flesh of swine given as a example.41 Finally, 
“laws” are interpreted as the customs and practices developed by man and 
human society that cannot be directly traced to a divine source.42
 36. Steven A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 WISC. 
L. REV. 1431, 1540.
 37. See, e.g., Leviticus 23:3 (Sabbath is day of rest); Numbers 15:32–35 (punishment of Sabbath-
breaker). 
 38. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Contracts of Genesis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 15 (1993).  
 39. See, e.g., Genesis XXVI, 2, THE SONCINO EDITION OF THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS 
95 & n.5 (J.H. Hertz ed., 2d ed. 1960). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Against this background, the infield fly rule cannot be deemed a 
commandment by any stretch of the imagination. It appears to be neither 
divinely inspired nor based upon a fundamental moral precept. The rule 
could only be deemed a statute if an observer wishes to view the 
commissioner’s office, the rules committee, and the owners as divinely 
inspired. This would be quite a stretch.43 While the infield fly rule may be 
a “law” within the meaning of the old testament commentators, this view 
roots its origin within human society rather than divine origin; hardly a 
robust conclusion or endorsement for a legal philosopher steeped in the 
natural law tradition—although one quite pleasing to a legal positivist or a 
legal realist. 
Perhaps the non-religious branch of natural law, often referred to as 
“natural rights,”44 can do better with the infield fly rule. There is a long 
tradition including Aristotle and key enlightenment figures and continuing 
through modern notions of fundamental rights that conceives of law as 
originating in the recurring and eternal conceptions of human experience. 
Questions of law remain inextricably intertwined with morality and 
visions of what represents the “good.” How then does the infield fly rule 
promote the Aristotlean notion of the “good,”45 the enlightenment notion 
of “inalienable rights,”46 or Dworkin’s notion of “fundamental rights”?47
The infield fly rule certainly is not immoral on its face. It promotes 
notions of fair play and decency and deters a certain limited type of 
opportunism. Far more empirical work remains to be done in order to 
determine whether equivalents of the infield fly rule exist in other sports 
and in other cultures in order to ascertain the kind of universality that 
suggests it rises to the level of customary natural law. To the extent that 
legal commentators have identified infield fly type rules in a wide variety 
of legal fields,48 or advocated the need for such rules,49 perhaps it is indeed 
fair to suggest that non-religious natural lawyers would be quite 
 43. This is not a reference to Hall of Famer Willie (Stretch) McCovey. For a brief biography of 
Mr. McCovey, see National Baseball Hall of Fame, Hall of Famer Biographies, Willie McCovey, at 
http://www.baseballhalloffame.org/hofers_and_honorees/ hofer_bios/mccovey_willie.htm (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2004). 
 44. See George Anastaplo, The Natural Right Component of American Law, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 
535 (1999). 
 45. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book I (David Ross et al. eds., Oxford University 
Press 1998). 
 46. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 47. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
 48. See supra notes 7–24. 
 49. See Berger, supra note 10. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss2/4
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comfortable with the infield fly rule as a secondary moral-based rule 
contributing to a just natural order. 
III. LEGAL POSITIVISM: IT’S A RULE, YOU GOTTA PROBLEM WITH THAT? 
The quest to find the moral center50 of the infield fly rule in order to 
determine its status as a law is an anathema to a legal positivist. A 
positivist in the Austinian tradition finds law as an emanation of the will of 
the sovereign, with more modern positivists seeing law as emerging from 
whatever process that the society recognizes as the source of law.51 Under 
the Holmesian view of positivism, law is prediction. Take the view of 
“bad man” and try to predict the consequence of a particular strand of 
social behavior.52 Under most modern positivist views the nature of law, a 
purported rule is law if it meets the rule of recognition for a society 
whether it is a just or unjust law.53 Positivism thus permits, and indeed 
requires, the observer and critic to engage the moral question separate 
from the question of whether a particular rule qualifies as law. 
Positivism rejects searching for the source of the infield fly outside of 
human institutions. Like all law, the infield fly rule is made, not deduced 
from either a “brooding omnipresence” of logical deduction or divine 
revelation.54 Thus, a positivist would have no trouble finding the infield 
fly rule to be a “law” of baseball.55 It flows from the will of the sovereign56 
and meets the rule of recognition for how baseball law is promulgated. To 
ascertain what such a law means, most legal positivists would use the tools 
of analytical philosophy to carefully parse the words chosen by the 
drafters and the context in which they appear.57 For most legal positivists, 
 50. The actual, rather than the moral, center of an infield fly, indeed any major league baseball, is 
composed of compressed cork and rubber. A minor league baseball’s center is made up of only 
compressed cork. See LAWRENCE P. FALLON & JAMES A. SHERWOOD, PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
OF THE 1999 AND 2000 MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALLS (2000). 
 51. ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998). 
 52. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897). 
 53. See SEBOK, supra note 51, at 270–71. 
 54. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1945) (opinion by Frankfurter, J.) 
(discussing the demise of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine of general federal common law). 
 55. This core insight of positivism was, of course, intuitively obvious even under the common 
law legal process vision that animated the Common Law Origins. See Common Law Origins, supra 
note 1, at 1474 (“The infield fly rule is neither a rule of law nor one of equity, it is a rule of baseball.”). 
 56. A strong argument historically would assign the commissioner the role of the sovereign for 
these purposes, although more recent events suggest an oligarchy of owners more closely fits this role.  
 57. See SEBOK, supra note 51, at 156–57; see also Anthony J. Sebok, Finding Wittgenstein at the 
Core of the Rule of Recognition, 52 SMU L. REV. 75, 84–86 (1999). 
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such an approach is necessary because few follow the actual game of 
baseball. 
Well, it’s a rule—so what? Here legal positivism runs out of gas like a 
out-of-shape pitcher rounding third base headed for home.58 Legal 
positivism functions best as a theory of law rather than theory of judging.59 
Moreover, it cannot help one judge the quality of a rule except by 
reference to the normative standards of the observer. Thus, any given 
positivist may favor or oppose the current version of the infield fly rule,60 
but positivism itself does not give one the tools to identify the better rule. 
IV. LEGAL REALISM AND TYRANNY OF THE GAME 
No analysis of twentieth century jurisprudence can be complete 
without a serious discussion of legal realism.61 No jurisprudential 
movement has as distinguished a pedigree, such a profound impact, so 
many post-modern heirs, or the ability to plausibly claim that we are all 
adherents now.62 Grounded in the proto-realism and positivism of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, legal realism makes common cause with the positivists 
in rejecting an extra-human source of law or an organic connection 
between law and morality.  
Realism’s unique claim is to examine the seemingly neutral rules of 
legal doctrine for the social policies and forces that are the unconscious or 
disingenuous drivers of legal policy.63 The majority of the legal realists 
focused their attention on the so-called “private” law of contracts, torts, 
and property to uncover the “public” nature of legal rules, the power 
interests being served and the disguise of conscious policy choices masked 
by common law decisions.64 For example, in the torts field, scholars like 
Leon Green traced the development of the demise of absolute liability for 
 58. For those positivists not following the game, please see either author for an explanation of 
this metaphor. For an explanation of the centrality of metaphor in legal thought, see supra note 8. 
 59. But see SEBOK, supra note 51 (acknowledging consensus view but arguing for theory of 
adjudication along legal process lines based on positivist principles). 
 60. See OFFICIAL RULES, supra note 4, at 27. 
 61. For a serious discussion of legal realism, see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 
1927–1960 (1986); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). 
Those expecting a serious discussion of this important jurisprudential school in this article will, of 
course, be disappointed, but clearly have not been paying attention. 
 62. Cf. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 267, 267 (1997) (noting the popular cliché “we are all realists now”). 
 63. TWINING, supra note 61, at 79–80. 
 64. A smaller wing of realists applied these same techniques and insights to the field of 
government regulation. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Language of Law and the Language of 
Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283, 290 (2001). 
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trespass involving interference with air rights over property to the rise and 
need for commercial aviation.65 Similarly, Green organized his casebook 
on torts around cases on railroads, automobiles, telegraphs, etc., rather 
than around misleading and indeterminate legal concepts such as duty or 
proximate cause.66  
The realists were thus more interested in the social sciences and the 
insights they reveal about public policy choices then the legal rules which 
obscure the choices being made by judges in a common law system.67 The 
realist movement ultimately lost much of its influence during the years of 
World War II as natural law reasoning proved a more satisfying counter to 
the rise of the Fascist powers, and legal process theories grounded in 
positivism gained influence after the war.68 However, the realists can 
claim as their heirs both the modern day law and society movement, 
incorporating the need for social science analyses of legal rules, and the 
critical legal studies movement, incorporating the rule skepticism of the 
realists.69
What then are the hidden (or not so hidden) power interests served by 
the seemingly neutral infield fly rule? What can social science reveal 
about the rule where legal doctrine is indeterminate and easily manipulable 
by result oriented judges (or umpires)? Who knows what evil lurks in the 
hearts of men?70
Such discretion subtly shifts power from the players to the umpires 
and, in so doing, to the team owners. Judges (and umpires) are selected by 
systems that favor interests of property over labor and create doctrine to 
mask the exercise of this power. A middle aged, primarily white, and all 
male,71 umpire judiciary is further entrenched over the athletes and the 
 65. See LEON A. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (1965). 
 66. See LEON A. GREEN ET AL., CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed., 1977). Professor Waller, 
as a first-year law student using the final edition of the book in 1979, thus remains part of the distinct 
minority of American law students never to have read the famous Palsgraf opinion since proximate 
cause is a mere fiction, and true tort liability depends on duty which in turn depends on public policy 
concerns which in turn depends on social science data outside the legal field. 
 67. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 
(1995). 
 68. SEBOK, supra note 51, at 116–17. 
 69. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 67. 
 70. The Shadow knows. See The Shadow Knows Home Page, at http://members.iquest.net/ 
~drivers/shadow.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 71. Consider Pam Postema, by all accounts the most successful female umpire in baseball 
history. She was an umpire in the minors from 1977–88, major league spring training 1988–89, and the 
Hall of Fame Game (Yankees v. Braves) in 1988. In 1989 her Triple-A contract was cancelled. She 
filed an unsuccessful federal sexual discrimination lawsuit. See Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l 
Baseball Clubs, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993); see also PAM POSTEMA, YOU’VE GOT TO HAVE BALLS TO 
MAKE IT IN THIS LEAGUE (1992). There has been at least one recent female umpire in Class A minors. 
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fans who are considerably more diverse than the umpires who rule over 
them.  
Oddly enough, the shift of power has the opposite effect in terms of 
income distribution, empowering the relatively poorer umpires at the 
expense of the vastly wealthier players (or owners). According to the 
realists, only social science will reveal the better public policy and the true 
interests served. Are the inequalities of large versus small market teams 
exacerbated by the discretion exercised under the guise of the rule? Is the 
rule a mere symbol of a pastoral national past time designed to distract 
fans from the realization that the game has irrevocably become the 
“product” of unregulable multinational corporations?72 Or to a hard-core 
skeptic realist, is application of the infield fly rule merely a product of 
whatever the umpire had for breakfast that morning?73
V. THE INTERNATIONAL FLY RULE 
The growing internationalization of legal practice and legal education 
counsel against a parochial American view of our topic. Like law, major 
league baseball is rapidly internationalizing through the incorporation of 
players from around the world,74 the existence of Canadian professional 
teams,75 international exhibitions, pre-season, regular season, and winter 
baseball outside of the United States,76 the wide spread popularity of 
organized baseball in numerous countries,77 and the promotion of the game 
through the international media and the Internet. 
See Steve Rosenbloom, Can’t Mask Her Love of the Game, CHI. TRIB., May 4, 2001, at 4-1. 
 72. See THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937) (making the same argument 
about role of antitrust law in mid–20th century America). 
 73. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, at 176 
(1992). See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1970). 
 74. Naoki Chiba, Pacific Professional Baseball Leagues and Migratory Patterns and Trends, 28 
J. SPORTS & SOC. ISSUES 193 (2004); George Vass, The Wide World of Baseball: Foreign-born 
Players are Filling Major League Rosters, Showing the True Measures of Global Talent in the 
American Pastime, BASEBALL DIG., Feb. 2003. 
 75. With the transfer of the Montreal Expos to the Washington, D.C. area, the Toronto Blue Jays 
are the only Major League Baseball team in Canada. See David Sheinin, Play Ball!; Move to 
Washington Could Make Expos More Competitive, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at D1. 
 76. See Eric Enders, Timeline of International Baseball, 1847–Present, at 
http://www.ericenders.com/internationalbb.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 77. See, e.g., J.L. Arbena, The Later Evolution of Sport in Latin America: The North American 
Influence, 18 INT’L J. HIST. SPORT 43 (2001) (discussing growth of baseball in Latin America); 
ROBERT WHITING, YOU GOTTA HAVE WA (1989) (discussing growth of baseball in Japan). To make 
matters even more peculiar, in the years prior to their transfer, the Montreal Expos played a portion of 
their “home” games in Puerto Rico. 
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The tools of international and comparative law enable an additional 
perspective that can enrich our understanding of the infield fly. But is 
there an international law of infield flies? Certainly not, if we limit 
ourselves to the classic law of nations. To the best of our knowledge, no 
nation has such a law, although we are willing to travel extensively in 
order to verify this point. 
Nor are there any known treaties or conventions explicitly dealing with 
the infield fly rule or other aspects of baseball. Despite a passion for 
harmonization and mixed public/private law making in virtually all areas 
of law, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (“Unidroit”), the International Chamber of 
Commerce, and all significant transnational organizations have seemingly 
ignored baseball, let alone the refined understanding of the game 
represented by the infield fly rule. From Professor Cohen’s perspective of 
having been involved in several such ventures in the commercial law area, 
this is an incontestable blessing. From Professor Waller’s perspective, a 
Convention on Baseball in the Americas would be beneficial but would 
undoubtedly be undercut by the unwillingness of the United States to 
ratify whatever emerged from such negotiations. 
Yet, there are signs that international law is working its way to the 
infield fly rule. First, the United Nations recently promulgated a 
convention prepared by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) on the “assignment of receivables”78 which, 
for the first time, provides coherent legal rules for international trade in 
“receivables.” What, we ask, is more receivable, and for a longer time, 
than an infield fly? Second, Unidroit has recently distributed a 
“Preliminary Draft Protocol on Matters Specific to Space Assets” for its 
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment.79 Aren’t pop-
ups the ultimate space assets? 
Finally, there remains the question of customary law, the second great 
source of international law. Customary international law consists of those 
virtually universal norms that nations (or other actors in the international 
sphere) follow out of a sense of obligation.80 The existence of infield fly 
 78. United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, Dec. 
12, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 776. 
 79. UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 
available at  http://www.unidroit.org/english/workprogramme/study072/study072j/72j-13rev-e.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 80. Positivists should stop reading here since the concept of recognizing law as emanating from 
custom, rather than recognized rules from an authorized human institution, is profoundly disturbing. 
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rules, their equivalents in other baseball cultures, the universality of such 
rules, and the reason why such rules are obeyed poses a fascinating 
research agenda that the authors invite their deans, interested alums, and 
foundations to support. 
VI. LAW AND ECONOMICS 
“Law and economics,” or the economic analysis of decisions that law 
makes, is, of course, all about efficiency.81 How ironic that our least 
efficient pastime82 should be subject to such analysis. Yet, the question of 
an efficient infield fly rule is a legitimate issue for debate. 
Determining what an efficient infield fly rule (or non-rule) would look 
like is no easy task, however. Efficiency, at root, is about 
maximization83—but what is to be maximized? Some casually refer to the 
quantity to be maximized as “wealth,” but this is simplistic. For one thing, 
even fungible and countable wealth does not all have equal value to its 
possessor. Bill Gates’s nine-hundredth million dollars presumably means 
less to him than his first million dollars.84 In baseball terms, an additional 
run scored by the Cleveland Indians in the ninth inning of an interleague 
game in which it is already ahead of the Chicago Cubs85 by a score of 19-3 
is likely not valued nearly as much as the team’s first four runs (or, 
perhaps, first 10 runs in light of the fallibility of bullpens and the 
propensity of baseballs to leave Wrigley Field). Moreover, not all things of 
value come in easily countable form, requiring some difficult translations 
to a common denominator such as money. Thus, economists often refer to 
that which is to be maximized as “utility”—a metric, not always 
rigorously defined or articulated, representing the marginal value of all 
valued things in the context of the problem at hand.86
This makes the average positivist deeply suspicious of the field of international law. This combined 
with the lack of positivist attention to the law of baseball makes the authors deeply suspicious of 
positivism. 
 81. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 12–17 (5th ed. 1998); Flynn, 
supra note 7, at 242–43. 
 82. It is frequently observed that baseball is the only major sport played without a clock. 
Moreover, the length of the game has increased dramatically over the past thirty years. See Allen 
Barra, Want to Speed Up Baseball? Take Away the Home Run, SALON MAG., at 
http://www.salon.com/news/sports/col/barra/2002/04/11/baseballtime (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 83. POSNER, supra note 81, at 12. 
 84. Id. at 500–02. 
 85. Teams chosen for the purpose of one co-author tweaking the other. See WALLER ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 503. 
 86. POSNER, supra note 81, at 13. 
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What are the components of utility which are sought to be maximized 
by a rule concerning infield flies? In identifying candidates for this 
position, we must recall the zero-sum nature of most components of 
baseball—what is good for the team on offense is bad for the team on 
defense, and vice versa. Again, with this aspect of baseball in mind, we 
must ask what is to be maximized. It is not runs, for while the offense 
seeks to maximize its runs, during a pop-up the defense is seeking to 
minimize those rather than maximize its own. Similarly, it cannot be outs 
that are the precious commodity. They are precious for the defense but 
generally poison to the offense. At bottom, the resource that is sought to 
be maximized must be victory. There is only one of those per game, and 
each team seeks it. Yet, even that conclusion might be short-sighted. A 
team that wins a game by use of a tactic that is reviled by other teams 
could conceivably be on the receiving side of practices in other games that 
would leave the winner of this game in a net loss position. Thus, the 
ultimate subject of maximization must not be a single victory but, rather, 
victories (plural).87
The calculus of efficiency for a victories-maximizing infield fly rule is 
daunting, especially in light of the fact that most rules seem symmetrical 
in that the net benefit to the offense and defense would seem to add to zero 
in many cases. Perhaps this analysis need not even occur, however. Coase 
taught us that the parties will bring about an efficient allocation 
themselves without regard to a rule, if only we are in that economists’ 
perfect world of no transaction costs.88 (This must also be the world of 
massless ropes and frictionless pulleys that inhabited the authors’ college 
physics problem sets.)89 Of course, for Coase’s theorem to work, we 
would need a free market in the allocation of costs and benefits from 
dropped pop-ups, a prospect unlikely to be publicly endorsed by the 
baseball powers that be. Perhaps an alternate baseball universe allowing 
such reallocation of strategic benefits could be developed and observed—
or would a thought experiment suffice?90 (By way of contrast, it has 
 87. Even then it should be noted that a victory for a first-place team with a large lead may have 
less utility than a victory for a team in a close race. 
 88. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  
 89. The authors would cite to their freshman physics course books, except that they sold them to 
pay for their sophomore year’s books. 
 90. A March 2003 search of the combined law review data base reveals that over 1000 law 
review articles have resorted to this sort of arm-chair theorizing rather than doing any actual empirical 
investigation in the real world. 
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already been noted that, in the [relatively] free market for players, Coase’s 
theorem does appear to work.)91
Any bargaining model, however, necessarily runs into the reality of 
agency costs92 (as distinguished from free-agency costs).93 After all, the 
interests of the separate parts of a team—batters, runners, pitchers, 
fielders, coaches, the manager, ownership—are hardly congruent, and may 
not be the same as the single-minded team interest in victories. Yet the 
team can only bargain through its agents, setting the possibility of new 
inefficiencies.94
Even if the hypothetical bargaining that we imagine yields a prediction 
as to what would happen if pop-ups could be the subject of such 
bargaining, this prediction leads us to an arguably efficient answer, but 
does not provide any moral insights into how the costs of this efficiency 
should be allocated. In other words, we might be maximizing efficiency, 
but not optimizing it.95
Among the possible further lines of inquiry for our economic analysis 
of pop-ups is the question of whether any rules that are identified should 
only be default rules—that is, are they mandatory and unchangeable or 
should they be changeable by agreement of the teams?96 As an alternative, 
perhaps each home team could choose its view of an efficient infield fly 
rule and mandate it for the game, sort of a “ground rules”97 approach. 
VII. FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 
In recent years, one branch of feminist legal theory has expressed 
disapproval of methods of legal analysis that assume that competing 
 91. See Another Liberal Pundit, April 23, 2002, at http://liberalpundit.blogspot.com 
/2002_04_21_liberalpundit_archive.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2004) (“But guess what? The Coase 
Theorem applies to major league baseball! As long as trades can include a cash component, even 
without free agency, players will end up on the teams for which they provide the best return. Instead of 
paying money to the player, the teams will pay money to each other.”). 
 92. POSNER, supra note 81, at 427–28. 
 93. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 94. POSNER, supra note 81, at 83. 
 95. See Neil B. Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: A Response to 
Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78, 95 (1987). 
 96. Cf. UCC § 1-302 (2002) (providing that most rules of the Uniform Commercial Code may be 
changed by agreement of the parties). 
 97. See Major League Baseball, Ballpark Ground Rules, at http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/ 
mlb/official_info/umpires/ground-rules.jsp (last visited Nov. 21, 2004) (listing the requirements for 
ground rule doubles for each major league stadium). 
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parties must necessarily act in competition with each other.98 Eileen 
Scallen has encapsulated the question as follows: 
The power of games is that they generally have definite outcomes—
one side wins and one side loses . . . . The uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the outcome of the game creates tension and 
drama; who will win? In the clarity of the outcome—whether the 
light of the victory or the darkness of the loss—it becomes harder, 
however, to care about the perennial question: Does it matter how 
you play the game?99
This school of thought posits that models emphasizing cooperation 
rather than competition should be given greater prominence in our 
analyses of legal rulemaking. As stated by Adam Arms, “The cooperative 
aspects of team sports are left out of legal discourse, the emphasis 
typically placed on ‘winning at all costs rather than fair play and rules.’”100
What would happen if such analyses based on cooperation rather than 
competition were applied to study of pop-ups and the crafting of an 
cooperatively-based infield fly rule?  
Several preliminary questions would require resolution. For example, 
when would the requisite cooperation take place? The hang time of a 
typical infield fly is approximately four seconds101—this is precious little 
time for cooperation to take seed and germinate. Perhaps the cooperation 
would take place in advance, behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance102 in 
which the teams would not know whether they would be the “poppers” or 
the “poppees.” (Of course, such non-contextual cooperation demands less 
selflessness than cooperation in the context of a particular team’s pop-up.) 
It is possible that such advance non-contextual cooperation might yield a 
 98. See, e.g., JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST 
JURISPRUDENCE (1999); MARTHA CHAMALLIS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (1999); 
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Frances E. Olsen ed., 1995). 
 99. Eileen A. Scallen, The Big Game: Metaphor and Education in the Simpson Trial, 6 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 289, 289 (1995). 
 100. Adam Arms, Metaphor, Women, and Law, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 257, 274 (1999) 
(quoting Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the 
Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225, 243 (1995)). 
 101. Author’s observation of Jim Thome’s pop-ups during Thome’s time as a member of the 
Cleveland Indians. The observation may be conservative, as exemplified by the following physics 
question posted on the “Kinematic Equations and Problem-Solving” page of the Glenbrook South 
(Illinois) High School Physics webpage: “A baseball is popped straight up into the air and has a hang-
time of 6.25 s. Determine the height to which the ball rises before it reaches its peak. (Hint: the time to 
rise to the peak is one-half the total hang-time.)” Lesson 6: Kinematic Equations and Problem Solving, 
at http://www.glenbrook.k12.il.us/gbssci/phys/Class/1DKin/U1L6d.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 102. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971). 
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result consistent with economic models that emphasize ex ante efficiency 
rather than efficient outcomes to each situation.103
The authors query whether such congruence of outcomes would 
suggest that there is an essential, and hitherto unexplored, link between 
this aspect of feminist legal theory and law and economics world of 
efficiency, and suggest that baseball analysis might be stretched beyond its 
limits to answer this query. Knowing the results of cooperation might also 
enable us to settle our Coasian bets as to the parties’ allocation of the 
benefits of an infield fly rule. Would a rule crafted in the context of 
cooperation be different than a rule designed to maximize (or optimize) 
efficiency? If so, this might well have a profound implication for both of 
these schools of jurisprudence. 
VIII. CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
No study of the jurisprudence of the infield fly rule would be complete 
without analyzing it from the context of the critical legal studies 
movement.104 That movement, with its strong belief that legal rules are the 
product of power rather than, say, logic, fairness, or economic 
efficiency,105 could certainly cast the infield fly rule conundrum in a 
different light. But it is not obvious exactly what that light is. Just who is 
the sovereign that imposed the infield fly rule? What does it have to gain 
from the rule? Of course, at one level the very teams that must play by the 
infield fly rule are, in aggregate form, the sovereign that imposes it. The 
teams collectively create the governing structure that makes the rules. 
Perhaps, as Pogo once said, “we have met the enemy and he is us.”106 Of 
course, this governed-as-governors analysis might prove too much; after 
all, the same analysis could be applied to democratic decision making. 
In addition, it must be remembered that baseball’s collective decision 
making might not be the product of a pure one-team, one-vote process. 
After all, the wealthier teams (whether in cash or in muscle) seem to have 
many ways to influence the outcome of baseball decisions. How else does 
one explain the development of an entire system that many believe is 
effectively devoted to the care and feeding of large market teams? 
 103. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 81, at 28. 
 104. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); GARY MINDA, 
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END 106–27 (1995); 
Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 46 (1984). 
 105. MINDA, supra note 104, at 106. 
 106. See Walt Kelly, at http://www.bpib.com/kelly.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004) (biography of 
Walt Kelly, creator of cartoon strip Pogo). 
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Certainly, critical legal studies can cast the infield fly rule in a new and 
perhaps more sinister light. 
Indeed, it is possible to reconceptualize the infield fly rule as an 
example of the hegemony of power-pitching teams over finesse-pitching 
teams. Power pitchers tend to allow a disproportionate number of base 
runners, especially through walks, but they also tend to generate more 
pop-ups than ground balls. Finesse pitchers, on the other hand, tend to 
allow fewer base runners and retire more batters on ground balls than on 
pop-ups. Whether such hegemonic behavior benefits only the strong over 
the weak, or results in greater baseball wealth for all through some form of 
trickle-down baseball economics, is left for further analysis.107
IX. POST-STRUCTURALISM AND THE DISCOURSE OF THE GAME 
The premises and methodology of this section derive in substantial part 
from the writings of Michel Foucault, particularly in his work of 
uncovering the archeology and genealogy of the growth of power through 
the creation of the scientific and professional disciplines and specialized 
discourses.108 While the teachings of Foucault have been extensively 
 107. Perhaps further questions should be directed to Jim Walsh, the Reference Services Librarian 
at the Mercer University law library, who, on his web-published resume, lists his interests as follows: 
Areas of law—legal research, technology and law, U.S. constitutional law, intellectual 
property, administrative law, appellate practice, energy law and critical legal studies. Other 
interests—playing with my kids, running, film, American Studies, baseball, Linux, 
geocaching, and building Lego Mindstorm robots. 
Jim Walsh: Reference Services Librarian, Law Library, at http://www.law.mercer.edu/resources/ 
staffdata.cfm?staffid=282 (last visited Nov. 21, 2004) (emphasis added). 
 Alternatively, another source for further elucidation could be Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., former 
Chief Judge of the South Carolina Court of Appeals, who presented a program described as follows to 
the International Association of Defense Counsel: 
“Mrs. Robinson’s Case,” a dramatic performance of a hypothetical case, decided in the 
Supreme Court of Newgarth, a mythical appellate court. IADC volunteers will act as the 
judges, a group as wildly diverse as the Serengeti migration. As usual, they are engaged in the 
crude and brutal business of sitting in judgment on their fellow human beings. The opinions 
of the judges illustrate the eternal problems of humankind. A number of vastly different and 
conflicting schools of jurisprudence will be illustrated, including original intent, legal realism, 
law and economics, law and literature, law and baseball, critical legal studies, and feminist 
legal theory.  
Joan Fullam Irick, President’s Page: IADC Explores Tomorrow’s Issues, at http://www.iadclaw.org/ 
StaticContent/pdfs/PresidentsPage042003.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2004) (emphasis added). 
 108. “What it [genealogy] really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, 
disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, 
hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge . . . .” MICHAEL FOUCAULT, 
POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972–1977 83 (Colin Gordon 
ed., 1980). For more on Foucault’s views on discourse, truth, and power, see id. at 82–87, 117, 126–
33, 233; MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE OF 
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applied in legal scholarship, they have not to our knowledge been applied 
to analyzes of the legal structures of baseball, and definitely not the infield 
fly rule.109
Foucault was suspicious of dialectical reasoning for the discourses and 
voices that it excluded.110 He did not entirely share the fascination of many 
Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars of his generation on the power of the 
state and focused instead on the many forms of non-state disciplinary 
power and discourse that shaped the world and imprisoned us from 
imagining new social structures and power relationships.111
What then to make of the infield fly rule from this perspective, which 
was just beginning to make its mark as Will Stevens was completing his 
baseball masterpiece? Understanding of the infield fly rule is probably the 
single defining aspect of baseball that distinguishes a baseball insider from 
an outsider. To master this rule is to be part of the discipline of baseball.112 
And yet, once in this select group you are subject to the discipline of 
baseball. Box scores rule your life and, in extreme cases, fantasy baseball 
becomes more interesting than the real thing.113 For you, time does begin 
on opening day114 and life frequently imitates the World Series.115 You 
probably prefer natural grass to artificial surfaces, perhaps in your living 
room as well. The designated hitter troubles you almost as much as 
poverty and injustice. If from Chicago, you probably prefer day baseball to 
night games. 
Foucault would have us look at who is excluded by this rite of passage 
represented by the mastery of the infield fly rule. The rule serves to 
exclude those who are simply too young or too amateurish to understand 
it. The rule exists in most little leagues,116 high school baseball,117 most 
LANGUAGE (Alan Sheridan trans., 1972). 
 109. Cf. ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 15–25 (Annette Lavers trans., 1988) (discussing 
cultural and semiotic significance of professional wrestling in 1950s France). 
 110. See generally ALAN HUNT & GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND THE LAW: TOWARDS A 
SOCIOLOGY OF GOVERNANCE (1994). 
 111. Id. at 17–20. 
 112. A recent Google search for “infield fly rule” revealed 4,830 matches (search conducted Feb. 
29, 2004). 
 113. Only a devotee of rotisserie league baseball, or its many equivalents, can understand the 
pressure when a pitcher on your “fantasy” faces your real life favorite team including a key slugger 
from your “fantasy” team. One ends up constructing elaborate arguments seeking to morally justify 
rooting for the pitcher on the opposing team to win the game by a 2-1 score with the losing team 
scoring only by a home run by the slugger on your fantasy team. 
 114. THOMAS BOSWELL, WHY TIME BEGINS ON OPENING DAY (1984). 
 115. THOMAS BOSWELL, HOW LIFE IMITATES THE WORLD SERIES (1982). 
 116. See, e.g., Albany Little League Local Rules, at http://www.albanylittleleague.org 
/rulesour.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004) (listing rules for little league games in Albany, California); 
North Regina Little League Rule Book, at http://www.nrlittleleague.com/content/morerules.asp (last 
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softball leagues,118 as well as Major League Baseball. It serves as an 
intellectual marker of who is ready for the game.119 The rule is also 
perceived to exclude women, or at least to mark them as unworthy and 
incapable of understanding the nuances of the game.120
In addition to “who” is excluded by such discourse, Foucault would 
have us consider “what” is excluded. In understanding the minutia of the 
game, you become a slave to the discourse. Rules that are socially and 
historically contingent121 and contestable begin to look permanent, 
inevitable, and essential to civilized society. Radical reinvention and 
reimagination of the game becomes virtually impossible. The discourse of 
the game empowers the status quo and channels dissent into meaningless 
gestures (Disco Demolition Night?) that only reinforce the channels dug 
by the way we understand “baseball.” Or perhaps, Foucault is best 
understood as yet another dead white male European philosopher who can 
only be applied to the American national past time by tenured 
academicians with too much time on their hands. 
visited Nov. 21, 2004) (listing rules for little league games in Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada); 
Northwest Washington Little League Rules, at http://www.nwlldc.org/nwll_rules.html (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2004) (listing rules for little league games in Washington, D.C.). 
 117. See Jason Frakes, Infield Fly Grounded PSJ’s Rally, May 16, 2000, available through 
http://www.newsherald.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2001). 
 118. See Edinburgh Softball League Local Rules, at http://www.softball.org.uk/ 
teams_esl_rules.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 119. In contrast, the infield fly rule normally is not part of T-Ball, the version of baseball for the 
youngest players. See Baseball/Softball/T-Ball Rules, at http://www.kidsports.org/rules_policies/ 
generalrules_baseball.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004); cf. JUGS Pitching Machine Leagues, at 
http://www.thejugscompany.com/coaches/pitchingleague.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2004) (commercial 
web site for company manufacturing pitching machine for leagues with young players recommending 
no infield fly rule). 
 120. The columnist and (alleged) humorist Lewis Grizzard explained the differences between the 
sexes as follows: 
Women, [he explained, as if anyone could explain women,] have absolutely no idea, no 
comprehension of the infield fly rule. The infield fly rule is one of the reasons that the planet 
keeps turning. If you didn't have the infield fly rule and you hit a pop-up, the runners on first 
and second wouldn’t know whether to run or not, and the infielder could screw around and 
not catch it on purpose . . . it would be chaos! When I try to explain the infield fly rule to 
women, they look up at me and say, The what? 
Paul Greenberg, A Collection of Valentines, at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/paulgreenberg/ 
printpg20010221.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2001). 
 121. The infield fly rule did not exist prior to the 1890s although organized baseball had been in 
existence for three decades. See Baseball Almanac Rule Change Timeline, at http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/ruleschng.shtml (time line of rule changes in baseball) (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
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X. ANARCHY/XFL APPROACH 
Critical legal studies has a distant cousin in the jurisprudence of 
anarchy.122 In the early twenty-first century, athletic jurisprudence has 
spawned an anarchic strand. This strand of legal nihilism has been 
popularized most particularly by its leading practitioner, Vince McMahon, 
under the rubric “smashmouth” sports.123 Under this view, sports becomes 
sports entertainment. Old sports can be seen in a new, and perhaps 
unadulterated light, by the repeal of rules that are designed to eliminate the 
purest and rawest forms of competition in the interests of effete ideals 
such as grace, fairness, and the prevention of injury. In the XFL,124 for 
example, the major rule change (other than allowing cameras to go where 
no camera had gone before)125 was the elimination of football’s rough 
equivalent of the infield fly rule—the fair catch rule. Elimination of this 
anticompetitive rule would, it was hoped, stoke the competitive fires of the 
opposing teams, yielding a “truer” game. 
Was this attempt to commercialize anarchy successful? We may never 
know—or at least not until we solve the conundrum about the tree falling 
in the forest that no one hears.126 After all, the XFL was a resounding 
failure.127 Would elimination of the infield fly rule yield the commercial 
benefits sought by the XFL experiment? Even on the XFL’s own terms, 
the answer would appear to be no. Unlike football’s fair catch rule, 
elimination of infield fly rule would not significantly increase the chances 
of injury or of the sight of blood—the apparent desiderata of the XFL. 
Perhaps, though, if the repeal of the infield fly rule were accompanied by 
the repeal of equally antique baseball rules against interference by 
members of the offensive team with the defense’s attempts to field batted 
balls,128 the repeal of the infield fly rule could lead to new strategic 
 122. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864–69 (1992) (discussing jurisprudence of 
doubt). 
 123. XFL Unveils Smashmouth Names, at http://www.canoe.ca/FootballXFL/aug24_xfl.html (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 124. This term is not really an abbreviation inasmuch as it has no fully-spelled antecedent. The 
“X”, however, is designed to remind the reader of “extreme.” 
 125. Walt Belcher, Xtreme Measures, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5492785. 
 126. This cliche of undergraduate philosophy classes has been cited in 37 law review articles 
contained in the combined law review Lexis database as of March 2003. 
 127. Gregg Easterbrook, The Real Reason the XFL Folded, SLATE MAG., Dec. 31, 2001, at 
http://slate.msn.com/id/2060282 (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 128. Offensive interference is defined as: 
an act by the team at bat which interferes with, obstructs, impedes, hinders or confuses any 
fielder attempting to make a play. If the umpire declares the batter, batter–runner, or a runner 
out for interference, all other runners shall return to the last base that was in the judgment of 
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frontiers. Perhaps, even, baseball would move from its monomaniacal 
obsession with the zone defense129 to a man-on-man model wherein one 
defender’s responsibility might be to “take out” the runner on second base. 
Ultimately, such anarchic baseball might be seen as a return to the 
game’s roots. After all, originally a player was “put out” by being struck 
with the ball thrown by a fielder.130 Are these roots purer, or simply more 
primitive? (Or are these two qualities synonymous?)131
In any event, determining the infield fly rule through a jurisprudence of 
anarchy has some advantages—complexity and subtlety are not likely to 
be the hallmarks of such a rule. Accordingly, the rule might be more easily 
understood by casual baseball fans than, say, the scoring rule that 
determines whether a relief pitcher is entitled to be credited with a save.132 
Accessibility of a society’s rules could be said to be an important step in 
establishing their legitimacy. On the other hand, the rule, apart from the 
context, might not be outcome-determinative inasmuch as it might depend 
on the size and strength (and willingness to engage in fisticuffs) of the 
players on the field at the time. 
One variation of this anarchic approach to rule making would be to 
take the power to make the rules away from the normal rulemakers. In the 
early 1950s, for example, St. Louis Browns owner Bill Veeck removed 
certain strategic decisions from the purview of the manager. Veeck gave 
all fans entering the park (a paltry number, to be sure) signs on which were 
printed directions such as “steal,” “hit-and-run,” and “intentional walk,” 
and the fans were polled at appropriate moments. Under Veeck’s orders, 
the manager was required to follow the dictates of the fans.133 Of course, 
applying such fan-centric rulemaking principles to the infield fly rule 
could likely result in a decided home field advantage. 
the umpire, legally touched at the time of the interference, unless otherwise provided by these 
rules. 
In the event the batter–runner has not reached first base, all runners shall return to the base 
last occupied at the time of the pitch.” 
OFFICIAL RULES, supra note 4, at 29. 
 129. Baseball defenders take to their zone positions with such regularity that the occasional 
deviation from standard “zones” is considered quite newsworthy. Consider, for example, the 
“Williams Shift” (also known as the Boudreau Shift) utilized by the Cleveland Indians (then managed 
by Lou Boudreau) in the late 1940s when facing Ted Williams. For unknown reasons this shift most 
recently was employed against the lesser known Brian Daubach of the Chicago White Sox in a spring 
training game. 
 130. See Baseball Almanac Rule Change Timeline, supra note 121. 
 131. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Herbert W. Schneider ed., 1958) (1651). 
 132. OFFICIAL RULES, supra note 4, at 189 (Rule 10.20). 
 133. See BILL VEECK, VEECK AS IN WRECK 219–21 (1962). 
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Another XFL-inspired critique of the infield fly rule emerges from the 
anti-intellectual branch of XFL philosophy. For example, one 
commentator compiling a list of “Vince McMahon Inspired Keys to Better 
Baseball,” led his list as follows: 
Maybe if the game were more exciting, more people would be 
interested. I think we should change baseball rules using Vince 
McMahon's XFL model. McMahon started up the XFL in hopes of 
making it more exciting and less predictable. He took some stupid 
NFL rules and made them sane. He took some sane NFL rules and 
made them stupid. Maybe that's what baseball needs, too: 
interchanging sanity and stupidity. I think I can help with that. Here 
are my McMahon-inspired XLB rule changes:  
Rule Change #1: No Infield fly rule. Are you tired of trying to 
figure out the infield fly rule? How many outs are there? How many 
are on base and which bases are they on? Is the trajectory of the 
airborne baseball great enough to warrant calling the infield fly 
rule? You need degrees in math AND physics to determine a ruling 
on some of them. My rule change makes it very simple: No infield 
fly. You hit a pop-up to an infielder, you're suspended for the 
season for wasting our time. We don't have time for intelligence 
here. This is a game of skill and brute force. I don't want to have to 
bring the chess club into the dugout for a rules debate. Don't waste 
our time--either hit the baseball hard or don't hit it at all. This rule is 
so easy, even the nacho vender can figure it out.134
CONCLUSION 
Common Law Origins accomplished what few other law review articles 
have achieved—a paradigm shift that created a movement. It has freed 
countless lawyers and baseball fans to think about baseball through the 
lens of law and vice-versa.135 Moreover, it created our opportunity to 
consider the infield fly rule from a wealth of jurisprudential perspectives 
that reveal as much about the authors as they do about the rules of baseball 
and legal philosophy, and ultimately to show that pop-ups should be taken 
seriously
 134. Mark Wentz, Vince McMahon Inspired Keys to Better Baseball, at 
http://www.wentzmania.com/baseball0223.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2004). 
 135. See generally WALLER ET AL., supra note 6. 
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